Sample Audit Checklist for CJIS Security Policy (CJISSECPOL) Area 6

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
5.6	Identification and Authentication (IA) ¹					
1.	Has the Tribe or TGRA developed, documented, and disseminated to all authorized personnel an agency-level identification and authentication policy that:					
	 Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance? Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines? 				IA-1, a.1.(a) IA-1, a.1.(b)	
2.	Has the Tribe or TGRA developed, documented, and disseminated to all authorized personnel procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication controls?				IA-1, a.2	
3.	Based on inquiry and record examination, has the Tribe or TGRA designated organizational personnel with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures?				IA-1, b	
4.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA review and update the current identification and authentication:					
	• Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Criminal Justice Information (CJI) / Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI / CHRI?				IA-1, c.1	
	• Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI / CHRI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI / CHRI?				IA-1, c.2	

¹ These requirements are sanctionable for audit beginning October 1, 2024.

#	QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
5.	Does the Tribe or TGRA uniquely identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique identification with processes acting on behalf of those users?				IA-2	
6.	Based on inquiry and record examination, has the Tribe or TGRA implemented multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts?				IA-2, (1)	
7.	Based on inquiry and record examination, has the Tribe or TGRA implemented multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts?				IA-2, (2)	
8.	Based on inquiry and record examination has the Tribe or TGRA implemented replay-resistant ² authentication mechanisms for access to privileged and non- privileged accounts?				IA-2, (8)	
9.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification (PIV)- compliant credentials ³ ?				IA-2, (12)	
10.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA uniquely identify and authenticate agency-managed devices before establishing network connections?				IA-3	
	In the instance of local connection, the device must be approved by the TGRA and the device must be identified and authenticated prior to connection to a TGRA asset.					

² Replay-resistant techniques include protocols that use nonces or challenges such as time synchronous or cryptographic authenticators.

³ Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV)-compliant credentials applies to organizations implementing logical access control and physical access control systems. PIV-compliant credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. The adequacy and reliability of PIV card issuers are authorized using [SP 800-79-2]. Acceptance of PIV-compliant credentials includes derived PIV credentials, the use of which is addressed in [SP 800-166]. The DOD Common Access Card (CAC) is an example of a PIV credential.

#	QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
11.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA manage system identifiers by:					
	• Receiving authorization from organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier?				IA-4, a	
	• Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device?				IA-4, b	
	 Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device? Dreventing rays of identifiers for any (1) 				IA-4, c	
	• Preventing reuse of identifiers for one (1) year?				IA-4, d	
12.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency					
	or nonagency?				IA-4, (4)	
13.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA manage system authenticators by:					
	• Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator?				IA-5, a	
	• Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization?				IA-5, b	
	• Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use?				IA-5, c	
	• Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators					
	and for revoking authenticators?				IA-5, d	
	• Changing default authenticators prior to first use?				IA-5, e	
	• Changing or refreshing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticator compromise?				IA-5, f	
	• Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification?				IA-5, g	

QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
• Requiring individuals to take, and having					
protect authenticators?				IA-5, h	
 Changing authenticators for group or role 					
accounts when membership to those				IA-5. i	
accounts changes?				,	
• Ensuring the following Authenticator					
Assurance Level 2 (AAL2) Specific					
Requirements:					
• Authentication occurs by the use					
authenticator or a combination of					
two single-factor authenticators?				IA-5, j (1)	
\circ If the multi-factor authentication					
process uses a combination of two					
single-factor authenticators, then it					
includes a Memorized Secret					
authenticator and a possession-				IA-5, j (2)	
• Cryptographic authenticators used					
at AAL2 use approved				IA-5, j (3)	
cryptography?					
• At least one authenticator used at					
AAL2 is replay resistant?				IA-5, j (4)	
 Communication between the 					
authenticated protected channel?				IA-5, j (5)	
• Verifiers operated by government					
agencies at AAL2 are validated to					
meet the requirements of Federal					
Information Processing Standard				IA-5, j (6)	
(FIPS) 140 Level 1?					
• Authenticators procured by					
to meet the requirements of FIPS					
140 Level 1?				IA-5, j (/)	
• If a device such as a smartphone is					
used in the authentication process,					
then the unlocking of that device					
(typically done using a Personal					
hiometric) is NOT considered one					
of the authentication factors?				IA-5, j (8)	
• If a biometric factor is used in					
authentication at AAL2, then the					
performance requirements stated					

#	QUESTION	in IA 5 m Biometric	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	0	Requirements are met? Reauthentication of the subscriber				IA-3, J (9)	
		is repeated at least once per 12 hours during an extended usage session?				IA-5, j (10)	
	0	Reauthentication of the subscriber is repeated following any period of inactivity lasting 30 minutes or longer?				IA-5, j (11)	
	0	The Credential Service Provider (CSP) employs appropriately tailored security controls from the moderate baseline of security controls defined in the				IA-5, j (12)	
	0	CJISSECPOL? The CSP ensures that the minimum assurance-related controls for moderate-impact				IA-5. i (12)	
	0	The CSP complies with records retention policies in accordance with applicable laws and				LA 5 ; (12)	
	O	regulations? If the CSP opts to retain records in the absence of any mandatory requirements, then the CSP conducts a risk management process, including assessments of privacy and security risks to determine how long records should be retained and informs subscribers of that retention				IA-3, J (13)	
		policy?				IA-5, j (14)	
	• Verify to all ((RP) a	ving privacy requirements that apply CSPs, verifiers, and Relying Partys as follows:					
	0	The CSP employs appropriately tailored privacy controls from the CJISSECPOL?				IA-5, k (1)	
	0	If the CSP processes attributes for purposes other than identity proofing, authentication, or attribute assertions (collectively "identity service"), related fraud mitigation, or to comply with law or legal process, then the CSP					

QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
• Confir require	implements measures to maintain predictability and manageability commensurate with the associated privacy risk? ming the following general ements applicable to AAL2				IA-5, k (2)	
authen	CSDs as a set in a se					
0	cSPs provide subscriber instructions on how to appropriately protect a physical authenticator against theft or loss? The CSP provides a mechanism to revoke or suspend the				IA-5, 1 (1)	
	authenticator immediately upon notification from subscriber that loss or theft of the authenticator is suspected?				IA-5, 1 (2)	
0	If required by the authenticator type descriptions in IA-5(1), then the verifier implements controls to protect against online guessing attacks?				IA-5, 1 (3)	
0	If required by the authenticator type descriptions in IA-5(1) and the description of a given authenticator does not specify otherwise, then the verifier limits consecutive failed authentication attempts on a single account to no more than 100?				IA-5, 1 (4)	
0	If signed attestations are used, then they are signed using a digital signature that provides at least the minimum security strength specified in the latest revision of 112 bits as of the date of this					
0	publication (9/14/2023)? If the verifier and CSP are separate entities (as shown by the dotted line in Figure 7 Digital Identity Model), then communications between the verifier and CSP occur through a mutually-authenticated secure channel (such as a client-				IA-5, 1 (5)	
	authenticated Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection)?				IA-5, 1 (6)	

#	QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	0	If the CSP provides the subscriber with a means to report loss, theft, or damage to an authenticator using a backup or alternate authenticator, then that authenticator is either a memorized secret or a physical authenticator?				14 5 1 (7)	
	0	If the CSP chooses to verify an address of record (i.e., email, telephone, postal) and suspend authenticator(s) reported to have been compromised, thenThe suspension is reversible if the subscriber successfully authenticates to the CSP using a valid (i.e., not suspended) authenticator and requests				IA-3, I (7)	
	0	reactivation of an authenticator suspended in this manner? If and when an authenticator				IA-5,1(8)	
		expires, it is NOT usable for authentication?				IA-5,1(9)	
	0	The CSP has a documented process to require subscribers to surrender or report the loss of any physical authenticator containing attribute certificates signed by the CSP as soon as practical after expiration or receipt of a renewed					
	0	authenticator? CSPs revoke the binding of authenticators immediately upon notification when an online identity ceases to exist (e.g., subscriber's death, discovery of a fraudulent subscriber), when requested by the subscriber, or when the CSP determines that the				IA-5,1(10)	
	0	subscriber no longer meets its eligibility requirements? The CSP has a documented process to require subscribers to surrender or report the loss of any physical authenticator containing certified attributes signed by the CSP within five (5) days after				IA-5,1(11)	

#	QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
		revocation or termination takes place?				IA-5, 1 (12)	
	• Verify	ving the following biometric					
	requir	ements:					
	0	Biometrics are used only as part of					
	0	multi-factor authentication with a					
		physical authenticator (something				IA-5, m (1)	
		vou have)?					
	0	An authenticated protected					
	0	channel between sensor (or an					
		endpoint containing a sensor that					
		resists sensor replacement) and					
		verifier is established?				IA-5, m (2)	
	0	The sensor or endpoint is					
	0	authenticated prior to capturing					
		the biometric sample from the					
		claimant?				IA-5, m (3)	
	0	The biometric system operates					
	0	with a False Match Rate (FMR)					
		[ISO/IFC 2382-37] of 1 in 1000					
		or better. This FMR is achieved					
		under conditions of a conformant					
		attack (i.e. zero-effort impostor					
		attempt) as defined in [ISO/IFC				IA-5, m (4)	
		30107-11?					
	0	The biometric system allows no					
	0	more than 5 consecutive failed					
		authentication attempts or 10					
		consecutive failed attempts of the					
		presentation attack detection					
		(PAD) demonstrating at least 90%					
		resistance to presentation attacks					
		is implemented?				IA-5, m (5)	
	0	Once the limit on authentication					
	0	failures has been reached, the					
		biometric authenticator either					
		 Imposes a delay of at least 					
		30 seconds before the next					
		attempt increasing					
		exponentially with each					
		successive attempt?				IA 5 m(6)i	
		 Disables the biometric user 				1A-3, 11(0)	
		authentication and offers					
		another factor (e.g. a					
		different biometric					
		modality or a					
		PIN/Passcode if it is not					

QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	already a required factor) if such an alternative method is already available?				IA-5, m (6) ii	
0	The verifier makes a determination of sensor and endpoint performance, integrity, and authenticity?				IA-5, m (7)	
0	If biometric comparison is performed centrally, then use of the biometric as an authentication factor is limited to one or more specific devices that are identified					
0	using approved cryptography? If biometric comparison is performed centrally, then a separate key is used for				IA-5, m (8)	
0	identifying the device? If biometric comparison is performed centrally, then biometric representation				IA-5, m (9)	
0	as biometric revocation, referred to as biometric template protection in ISO/IEC 24745, is implemented? If biometric comparison is				IA-5, m (10)	
	transmission of biometrics are over the authenticated protected channel?				IA-5, m (11)	
0	Biometric samples and any biometric data derived from the biometric sample such as a probe produced through signal processing are zeroized					
	immediately after any training or research data has been derived?				IA-5, m (12)	
• Confir to the	ming authenticator binding refers					
betwee	en a specific authenticator and a					
subscr	iber's account, enabling the					
authen	ticator to be used — possibly in					
conjur	nction with other authenticators —					
to autr	ienticate for that account as					
0 0	Authenticators are bound to					
-	subscriber accounts by either					
	issuance by the CSP as part of					
	enrollment or associating a					

QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	subscriber-provided authenticator				IA-5, n (1)	
	that is acceptable to the CSP?					
0	Throughout the digital identity					
	lifecycle, CSPs maintain a record					
	of all authenticators that are or					
	have been associated with each				$IA_{-5} n(2)$	
	Identity?				1113, 11(2)	
0	The CSP or verifier maintain the					
	authentiaction attempts?				IA-5, n (3)	
0	The CSP also verifies the type of					
0	user-provided authenticator so					
	verifiers can determine					
	compliance with requirements at				IA-5, n (4)	
	each AAL?					
0	The record created by the CSP					
C C	contains the date and time the					
	authenticator was bound to the				$IA_{-5} n(5)$	
	account?				1A-3, II(3)	
0	When any new authenticator is					
	bound to a subscriber account, the					
	CSP ensures that the binding					
	protocol and the protocol for					
	provisioning the associated key(s)				IA-5, n (6)	
	are done at AAL2?					
0	Protocols for key provisioning use					
	authenticated protected channels					
	or are performed in person to					
	(MitM) attacks?				IA-5, n (7)	
0	(MILIN) allacks? Binding of multi factor					
0	authenticators requires multi					
	factor authentication (or					
	equivalent) at identity proofing?				$IA_{-5} n(8)$	
0	At enrollment, the CSP binds at				ич <i>э</i> , п (ө)	
0	least one, and SHOULD bind at					
	least two, physical (something you					
	have) authenticators to the					
	subscriber's online identity, in					
	addition to a memorized secret or					
	one or more biometrics?				IA-5, n (9)	
0	At enrollment, authenticators at					
	AAL2 and IAL2 are bound to the					
	account?				IA-5, n (10)	
0	If enrollment and binding are					
	being done remotely and cannot					
	be completed in a single electronic					
	transaction, then the applicant					

QUESTION		YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	identifies themselves in each new binding transaction by presenting a temporary secret which was either established during a prior transaction, or sent to the applicant's phone number, email				14.5 (11)	
0	address, or postal address of record? If enrollment and binding are				IA-5, n (11)	
	being done remotely and cannot be completed in a single electronic transaction, then long-term authenticator secrets are delivered to the applicant within a protected session?				IA-5, n (12)	
0	If enrollment and binding are being done in person and cannot be completed in a single physical encounter, the applicant identifies themselves in person by either using a secret as described in IA-5					
	n (12), or through use of a biometric that was recorded during a prior encounter?				IA-5, n (13)	
0	If enrollment and binding are being done in person and cannot be completed in a single physical encounter, temporary secrets are NOT be reused?				IA-5, n (14)	
0	If enrollment and binding are being done in person and cannot be completed in a single physical encounter and the CSP issues long-term authenticator secrets during a physical transaction, they are loaded locally onto a physical device that is issued in person to the applicant or delivered in a					
0	manner that confirms the address of record? Before adding a new authenticator to a subscriber's account, the CSP first requires the subscriber to				IA-5, n (15)	
0	authenticate at AAL2 (or a higher AAL) at which the new authenticator will be used? If the subscriber's account has				IA-5, n (16)	
	only one authentication factor					

QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
0	bound to it, the CSP requires the subscriber to authenticate at AAL1 in order to bind an additional authenticator of a different authentication factor? If a subscriber loses all authenticators of a factor necessary to complete multi-factor				IA-5, n (17)	
0	authentication and has been identity proofed at IAL2, that subscriber repeats the identity proofing process described in IA- 12? If a subscriber loses all authenticators of a factor necessary to complete multi-factor				IA-5, n (18)	
0	identity proofed at IAL2 or IAL3, the CSP requires the claimant to authenticate using an authenticator of the remaining factor, if any, to confirm binding to the existing identity? If the CSP opts to allow binding of a new memorized secret with				IA-5, n (19)	
0	the use of two physical authenticators, then it requires entry of a confirmation code sent to an address of record? If the CSP opts to allow binding of a new memorized secret with the use of two physical				IA-5, n (20)	
0	authenticators, then the confirmation code consists of at least 6 random alphanumeric characters generated by an approved random bit generator [SP 800-90Ar1]? If the CSP opts to allow binding of a new memorized secret with the use of two physical authenticators, then the confirmation code is valid for a				IA-5, n (21)	
	maximum of / days but MAY be made valid up to 21 days via an exception process to accommodate addresses outside the direct reach of the U.S. Postal					

QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
Service. Confirmation codes sent by means other than physical mail are valid for a maximum of 5				IA = 5 + n(22)	
 winutes? Verifying session management: The following requirements apply to applications where a session is maintained between the subscriber and relying party to allow multiple interactions without repeating the authentication event each time. Session Binding Requirements: A session occurs between the software that a subscriber is running — such as a browser, application, or operating system (i.e., the session subject) — and the RP or CSP that the subscriber is accessing (i.e., the session host). A session secret which is shared between the subscriber's software and the subscriber's software a				IA-5, n (22)	
the service being accessed?The secret is presented directly by the subscriber's				IA-5, o (1)a	
 software or possession of the secret is proven using a cryptographic mechanism? The secret used for session binding is generated by the session host in direct 				IA-5, o (1)b	
 authentication event? A session is NOT considered at a higher 				IA-5, o (1) c	
 AAL than the authentication event? Secrets used for session binding are generated by the session host during an interaction, typically immediately following 				IA-5, o (1) d	
authentication?Secrets used for session binding are generated by				IA-5, o (1) e	

#	QUESTION	an approved random hit	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD $[A-5, o, (1)] f$	COMMENT
		 an approved failed in out generator [SP 800-90Ar1]? Secrets used for session binding contain at least 64 bits of entropy? Secrets used for session binding are erased or 				IA-5, o (1) I	
		invalidated by the session subject when the subscriber logs out?Secrets used for session				IA-5, o (1) h	
		binding are sent to and received from the device using an authenticated protected channel?				IA-5, o (1) i	
		 Secrets used for session binding time out and are not accepted after the times specified in IA-5 j (13) as appropriate for the AAL? Secrets used for session binding are NOT available to incompare 				IA-5, o (1) j	
		 to insecure communications between the host and subscriber's endpoint? Authenticated sessions do 				IA-5, o (1) k	
		 NOT fall back to an insecure transport, such as from https to http, following authentication? URLs or POST content contain a session identifier 				IA-5, o (1) l	
		 that is verified by the RP to ensure that actions taken outside the session do not affect the protected session? Browser cookies are 				IA-5, o (1) m	
		 tagged to be accessible only on secure (HTTPS) sessions? Browser cookies are accessible to the minimum 				IA-5, o (1) n	
		practical set of hostnames and paths?				IA-5, o (1) o	

 	 IA-5, o (1) p	
 	 IA-5, o (1) q	
 	 IA-5, o (2) a	
 	 IA-5, o (2) b	
 	 IA-5, o (2) c	
 	 IA-5, o (2) d	
		IA-5, o (1) p IA-5, o (1) q IA-5, o (2) a IA-5, o (2) b IA-5, o (2) c IA-5, o (2) c IA-5, o (2) d IA-5, o (2) e

⁴ At AAL2, a memorized secret or biometric, and not a physical authenticator, is required because the session secret is something you have, and an additional authentication factor is required to continue the session.

#	QUESTION	 If federated authentication is being used, then since the CSP and RP often employ separate session management technologies, there is NOT any. 	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
		 there is NOT any assumption of correlation between these sessions? An RP requiring reauthentication through a federation protocol — if possible within the protocol — specifies the maximum (see IA-5 i [10]) 				IA-5, o (2) f	
		 acceptable authentication age to the CSP? If federated authentication if being used and an RP has specific authentication age (see IA-5 j [10]) requirements that it has communicated to the CSP, then the CSP reauthenticates the subscriber if they have not 				IA-5, o (2) g	
		 subscriber if they have not been authenticated within that time period? If federated authentication is being used, the CSP communicates the authentication event time to the RP to allow the RP to decide if the assertion is sufficient for reauthentication and to determine the time for the 				IA-5, o (2) h	
		next reauthentication event?				IA-5, 0 (2) 1	
14.	Based on inquiry the Tribe or TGR	and record examination, does RA:					
	 Maintain expected, update th organizat have been indirectly 	a list of commonly-used, or compromised passwords and e list quarterly and when ional passwords are suspected to n compromised directly or ?				IA-5, (1)(a)1	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery? Allow user selection of long passwords 				IA-5, (1)(a)2	
	and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters?Employ automated tools to assist the user				IA-5, (1)(a)3	
	in selecting strong password authenticators?Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to				IA-5, (1)(a)4	
	follow basic password standards:					
	• Not be a proper name?				IA-5, (1)(a)5(a)	
	 Not be the same as the User ID? Expire within a maximum of 90 				IA-5, (1)(a)5(b)	
	 Not be identical to the previous 				IA-5, $(1)(a)5(c)$	
	ten (10) passwords?				IA-5, (1)(a)5(d)	
	• Not be displayed when entered?				IA-5, (1)(a)5(e)	
	 If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets are at least 8 characters in length? If chosen by the CSP or verifier using an approved random number generator, 				IA-5, (1)(a)6	
	memorized secrets are at least 6 characters in length?Truncation of the secret is NOT be				IA-5, (1)(a)7	
	 performed? Memorized secret verifiers do NOT 				IA-5, (1)(a)8	
	is accessible to an unauthenticated claimant?				IA-5, (1)(a)9	
	 Verifiers do NOT prompt subscribers to use specific types of information (e.g., "What was the name of your first pet?") when choosing memorized secrets? 				IA-5, (1)(a)10	
	• When processing requests to establish and change memorized secrets, verifiers compare the prospective secrets against a list that contains values known to be commonly used, expected, or				IA-5, (1)(a)11	
	compromised?					
	• If a chosen secret is found in the list, the CSP or verifier advises the subscriber that they need to calculate different secret?				14.5(1)(-)12	
	 If a chosen secret is found in the list, the 				1A-3, (1)(a)12	
	CSP or verifier provides the reason for rejection?				IA-5, (1)(a)13	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 If a chosen secret is found in the list, the CSP or verifier requires the subscriber to choose a different value? Verifiers implement a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively limits failed authentication attempts that can be made on the subscriber's account to no more. 				IA-5, (1)(a)14	
	on the subscriber's account to no more than five?Verifiers force a change of memorized				IA-5, (1)(a)15	
	secret if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator?The verifier uses approved encryption				IA-5, (1)(a)16	
	 The verifier uses approved eneryption when requesting memorized secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks? The verifier uses an authenticated protected channel when requesting 				IA-5, (1)(a)17	
	memorized secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks?				IA-5, (1)(a)18	
	 Verifiers store memorized secrets in a form that is resistant to offline attacks? Memorized secrets are salted and hashed 				IA-5, (1)(a)19	
	• Wemonzed secrets are safed and hashed using a suitable one-way key derivation function?				IA-5, (1)(a)20	
	 The salt is at least 32 bits in length and be chosen arbitrarily to minimize salt value collisions among stored hashes? Both the salt value and the resulting hash 				IA-5, (1)(a)21	
	 is stored for each subscriber using a memorized secret authenticator? If an additional iteration of a key 				IA-5, (1)(a)22	
	 derivation function using a salt value known only to the verifier is performed, then this secret salt value is generated with an approved random bit generator and of sufficient length? If an additional iteration of a key derivation function using a salt value 				IA-5, (1)(a)23	
	 known only to the verifier is performed, then this secret salt value provides at least the minimum-security strength? If an additional iteration of a key derivation function using a salt value known only to the verifier is performed, 				IA-5, (1)(a)24	

#	QUESTION then this secret salt value is stored separately from the memorized secrets?	YES	NO	N/A	<i>STANDARD</i> IA-5, (1)(a)25	COMMENT
15.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA verify:					
	 CSPs creating look-up secret authenticators use an approved random bit generator to generate the list of secrets? 				IA-5, (1)(b)1	
	 Look-up secrets are at least 20 bits of entropy? If look-up secrets are distributed online, then they are distributed over a secure channel in accordance with the post- 				IA-5, (1)(b)2	
	 enrollment binding requirements in IA-5 'n' 16 through 22? Verifiers of look-up secrets prompt the claimant for the next secret from their 				IA-5, (1)(b)3	
	authenticator or for a specific (e.g., numbered) secret?				IA-5, (1)(b)4	
	 A given secret from an authenticator is used successfully only once? If a look-up secret is derived from a grid (hings) and then each call of the arithmeticator. 				IA-5, (1)(b)5	
	(bingo) card, then each cell of the grid is used only once?				IA-5, (1)(b)6	
	• Verifiers store look-up secrets in a form that is resistant to offline attacks?				IA-5, (1)(b)7	
	 If look-up secrets have at least 112 bits of entropy, then they are hashed with an approved one-way function? If look-up secrets have less than 112 bits 				IA-5, (1)(b)8	
	 of entropy, then they are salted and hashed using a suitable one-way key derivation function? If look-up secrets have less than 112 bits of entropy, then the set is at least 22 bits 				IA-5, (1)(b)9	
	in length and be chosen arbitrarily to minimize salt value collisions among stored hashes?				IA-5, (1)(b)10	
	• If look-up secrets have less than 112 bits of entropy, then both the salt value and the resulting hash is stored for each look- up secret?				IA-5, (1)(b)11	
	• If look-up secrets that have less than 64 bits of entropy, then the verifier implements a rate-limiting mechanism					

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	that effectively limits the number of failed authentication attempts that can be made on the subscriber's account?The verifier uses approved encryption				IA-5, (1)(b)12	
	 when requesting look-up secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks? The verifier uses an authenticated protected channel when requesting look- 				IA-5, (1)(b)13	
	eavesdropping and MitM attacks?				IA-5, (1)(b)14	
16.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA verify:					
	• The out-of-band authenticator establishes a separate channel with the verifier in order to retrieve the out-of-band secret or authentication request?				IA-5, (1)(c)1	
	 Communication request: Communication over the secondary channel is encrypted unless sent via the public switched telephone network (PSTN)? 				IA-5, (1)(c)2	
	 Methods that do not prove possession of a specific device, such as voice-over-IP (VoIP) or email, are NOT used for out-of- band authentication? 				IA-5, (1)(c)3	
	• If PSTN is not being used for out-of-band communication, then the out-of-band authenticator uniquely authenticates itself by establishing an authenticated protected					
	 If PSTN is not being used for out-of-band communication, then the out-of-band authenticator communicates with the 				IA-5, $(1)(c)$ 4 IA-5, $(1)(c)$ 5	
	 Verifier using approved cryptography? If PSTN is not being used for out-of-band communication, then the key used to authenticate the out-of-band device is stored in suitably secure storage available to the authenticator application (e.g., keychain storage, TPM, TEE, secure 					
	 If the PSTN is used for out-of-band authentication and a secret is sent to the 				IA-5, (1)(c)6	

⁵ The secret key associated with an out-of-band device or authenticator application is critical to the determination of "something you have" and needs to be well protected.

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 out-of-band device via the PSTN, then the out-of-band authenticator uniquely authenticates itself to a mobile telephone network using a SIM card or equivalent that uniquely identifies the device? If the out-of-band authenticator sends an approval message over the secondary communication channel, it either accepts transfer of a secret from the primary channel to be sent to the verifier via the secondary communications channel, or present a secret received via the secondary channel from the verifier and prompt the claimant to verify the consistency of that secret with the 				IA-5, (1)(c)7	
	 primary channel, prior to accepting a yes/no response from the claimant which it sends to the verifier? The verifier does NOT store the identifying key itself, but uses a verification method (e.g., an approved hash function or proof of possession of the identifying key) to uniquely identify the authenticator? 				IA-5, (1)(c)8 IA-5, (1)(c)9	
	 Depending on the type of out-of-band authenticator, one of the following takes place: transfer of a secret to the primary channel, transfer of a secret to the secondary channel, or verification of secrets by the claimant? If the out-of-band authenticator operates by transferring the secret to the primary channel, then the verifier transmits a 				IA-5, (1)(c)10	
	 random secret to the out-of-band authenticator and then wait for the secret to be returned on the primary communication channel? If the out-of-band authenticator operates by transferring the secret to the secondary channel, then the verifier displays a random authentication secret to the claimant via the primary channel and then wait for the secret to be returned on the secondary channel from the claimant's 				IA-5, (1)(c)11	
	 out-of-band authenticator? If the out-of-band authenticator operates by verification of secrets by the claimant. 				IA-5, (1)(c)12	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	then the verifier displays a random authentication secret to the claimant via the primary channel, send the same secret					
	to the out-of-band authenticator via the					
	claimant, and then wait for an approval					
	(or disapproval) message via the				IA-5, (1)(c)13	
	secondary channel?					
	• The authentication is considered invalid if not completed within 10 minutes?				IA-5, (1)(c)14	
	 Verifiers accept a given authentication 					
	secret only once during the validity				IA-5, (1)(c)15	
	period?					
	• The verifier generates random authentication secrets with at least 20 bits				IA = (1)(-)1(-)	
	of entropy?				IA-5, (1)(c)16	
	• The verifier generates random					
	authentication secrets using an approved				IA-5, (1)(c)17	
	• If the authentication secret has less than					
	64 bits of entropy, the verifier implements					
	a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively					
	limits the number of failed authentication					
	subscriber's account as described in IA-5				IA-5.(1)(c)18	
	1 (3) through (4)?					
	• If out-of-band verification is to be made					
	using the PSTN, then the verifier verifies					
	being used is associated with a specific					
	physical device?				IA-5, (1)(c)19	
	• If out-of-band verification is to be made					
	using the PSTN, then changing the pre-					
	to be the binding of a new authenticator					
	and only occurs as described in IA-5 n				IA-5 (1)(c)20	
	(16) through (22)?				1110,(1)(0)20	
	• If PSIN is used for out-of-band authentication, then the CSP offers					
	subscribers at least one alternate					
	authenticator that is not RESTRICTED					
	and can be used to authenticate at the				IA-5, (1)(c)21	
	 If PSTN is used for out-of-band 					
	authentication, then the CSP provides					
	meaningful notice to subscribers					
	regarding the security risks of the					

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 availability of alternative(s) that are not RESTRICTED? If PSTN is used for out-of-band 				IA-5, (1)(c)22	
	authentication, then the CSP addresses any additional risk to subscribers in its risk assessment?				IA-5, (1)(c)23	
	• If PSTIN is used for out-of-band authentication, then the CSP develops a migration plan for the possibility that the RESTRICTED authenticator is no longer acceptable at some point in the future and include this migration plan in its digital identity acceptance statement?				IA-5, (1)(c)24	
17.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA verify:					
	 The secret key and its algorithm provides at least the minimum security strength of 112 bits as of the date of this publication? The nonce is of sufficient length to ensure 				IA-5, (1)(d)1	
	 that it is unique for each operation of the device over its lifetime? One-time Password (OTP) authenticators — particularly software-based OTP 				IA-5, (1)(d)2	
	generators —do NOT facilitate the cloning of the secret key onto multiple devices?				IA-5, (1)(d)3	
	• The authenticator output has at least 6 decimal digits (approximately 20 bits) of entropy?				IA-5, (1)(d)4	
	• If the nonce used to generate the authenticator output is based on a real-time clock, then the nonce is changed at least once every 2 minutes?				IA-5, (1)(d)5	
	 The OTP value associated with a given nonce is be accepted only once? The symmetric keys used by 				IA-5, (1)(d)6	
	authenticators are also present in the verifier and is strongly protected against compromise?				IA-5, (1)(d)7	
	• If a single-factor OTP authenticator is being associated with a subscriber account, then the verifier or associated CSP uses approved cryptography to either generate and exchange or to obtain the					

#	QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	secrets required to duplicate the authenticator output?				1A-3, (1)(d)8	
	 The verifier uses approved encryption when collecting the OTP? The verifier uses an exthemiseted 				IA-5, (1)(d)9	
	• The verifier uses an authenticated protected channel when collecting the OTP2				IA-5, (1)(d)10	
	 If a time-based OTP is used, it has a defined lifetime (recommended 30 seconds) that is determined by the expected clock drift — in either direction — of the authenticator over its lifetime, plus allowance for network delay and user entry of the OTP? 				IA-5, (1)(d)11	
	 Verifiers accepts a given time-based OTP only once during the validity period? 				IA-5, (1)(d)12	
	• If the authenticator output has less than 64 bits of entropy, the verifier implements a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively limits the number of failed authentication attempts that can be made on the					
	subscriber's account as described in IA-5 1 (3) through (4)?				IA-5, (1)(d)13	
	• If the authenticator is multi-factor, then each use of the authenticator requires the input of the additional factor?				IA-5, (1)(d)14	
	• If the authenticator is multi-factor and a memorized secret is used by the authenticator for activation, then that memorized secret is a randomly chosen numeric secret at least 6 decimal digits in					
	length or other memorized secret meeting the requirements of IA-5 (1)(a)?If the authenticator is multi-factor, then				IA-5, (1)(d)15	
	• If the authenticator is multi-factor, then use of a memorized secret for activation is rate limited as specified in IA-51(3) through (4)?				IA-5, (1)(d)16	
	• If the authenticator is multi-factor and is activated by a biometric factor, then that factor meets the requirements of IA-5 m, including limits on the number of					
	 If the authenticator is multi-factor, then the unencrypted key and activation secret or biometric sample — and any biometric data derived from the biometric sample 				IA-5, (1)(d)17	

#	<i>QUESTION</i> processing — is zeroized immediately	YES	<i>NO</i>	N/A	<i>STANDARD</i> IA-5, (1)(d)18	COMMENT
	 after an OTP has been generated? If the authenticator is multi-factor, the verifier or CSP establishes, via the authenticator source, that the authenticator is a multi-factor device? In the absence of a trusted statement that it is a multi-factor device, the verifier tracts the outhenticator as single factor in 				IA-5, (1)(d)19	
	accordance with IA-5 (1) (d) (1) through (13)?				IA-5, (1)(d)20	
18.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA verify:					
	• If the cryptographic authenticator is software based, the key is stored in suitably secure storage available to the authenticator application?				IA-5, (1)(e)1	
	• If the cryptographic authenticator is software based, the key is strongly protected against unauthorized disclosure by the use of access controls that limit access to the key to only those software components on the device requiring				IA-5, (1)(e)2	
	 access? If the cryptographic authenticator is software based, it does NOT facilitate the cloning of the secret key onto multiple devices? 				IA-5, (1)(e)3	
	 If the authenticator is single-factor and hardware-based, secret keys unique to the device can NOT be exportable (i.e., cannot be removed from the device)? the authenticator is hardware-based, the secret key and its algorithm provides at least the minimum-security length of 112 				IA-5, (1)(e)4	
	 bits as of the date of this publication (9/14/2023)? If the authenticator is hardware-based, the 				IA-5, (1)(e)5	
	challenge nonce is at least 64 bits in length?				IA-5, (1)(e)6	
	 If the authenticator is hardware-based, approved cryptography is used? 				IA-5, (1)(e)7	
	• Cryptographic keys stored by the verifier are protected against modification?				IA-5, (1)(e)8	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	• If symmetric keys are used, cryptographic keys stored by the verifier are protected				IA-5, (1)(e)9	
	 The challenge nonce is at least 64 bits in length? 				IA-5, (1)(e)10	
	• The challenge nonce is either unique over the authenticator's lifetime or statistically unique (i.e., generated using an approved random bit generator)?				IA-5, (1)(e)11	
	 The verification operation uses approved cryptography? 				IA-5, (1)(e)12	
	 If a multi-factor cryptographic software authenticator is being used, then each authentication requires the presentation of the activation factor? If the authenticator is multi-factor, then any memorized secret used by the 				IA-5, (1)(e)13	
	 authenticator for activation is a randomly chosen numeric secret at least 6 decimal digits in length or other memorized secret meeting the requirements of IA-5 (1) (a)? If the authenticator is multi-factor, then use of a memorized secret for activation 				IA-5, (1)(e)14	
	is rate limited as specified in IA-51(3) through (4)?				IA-5, (1)(e)15	
	 If the authenticator is multi-factor and is activated by a biometric factor, then that factor meets the requirements of IA-5 m, including limits on the number of consecutive authentication failures? If the authenticator is multi-factor, then the unencrypted key and activation secret or biometric sample — and any biometric data derived from the biometric germals. 				IA-5, (1)(e)16	
	such as a probe produced through signal processing — is zeroized immediately after an authentication transaction has taken place?				IA-5, (1)(e)17	
19.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA, for public key-based authentication:					
	• Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key?				IA-5, (2)(a)1	
	• Map the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group?				IA-5, (2)(a)2	

#	<i>QUESTION</i> Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA do the following, when public key infrastructure (PKI) is used:	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 Validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor, including checking certificate status information? Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation? 				IA-5, (2)(b)1 IA-5, (2)(b)2	
20.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA protect authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access?				IA-5, (6)	
21.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation and use by unauthorized individuals?				IA-6	
22.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA, implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines for such authentication?				IA-7	
23.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA, uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users?				IA-8	
24.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA, accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification (PIV)- compliant credentials from other federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTT) agencies?				IA-8, (1)	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
25.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA:					
	 Accept only external authenticators that are NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)-compliant? Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators? 				IA-8, $(2)(a)$	
26.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA conform to the following profiles for identity management: Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) or OpenID Connect?				IA-8, (4)	
27.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA require users to re- authenticate when: roles, authenticators, or credentials change, security categories of systems change, the execution of privileged functions occur, or every 12 hours?				IA-11	
28.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA:					
	 Identity proof users that require accounts for logical access to systems based on appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines? Resolve user identities to a unique individual? Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence? 				IA-12, a IA-12, b IA-12, c	
29.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA require evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority?				IA-12, (2)	
30.	Based on inquiry and record examination, does the Tribe or TGRA:					
	• Require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through agency-defined resolution, validation, and verification methods?				IA-12, (3)a	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	• Identity proofing is NOT be performed to determine suitability or entitlement to gain access to services or benefits?				IA-12, (3)b	
	 Collection of Personal Identifiable Information (PII) is limited to the minimum necessary to resolve to a unique identity in a given context? Collection of PII is limited to the minimum necessary to validate the 				IA-12, (3) c.1	
	 existence of the claimed identity and associate the claimed identity with the applicant providing identity evidence for appropriate identity resolution, validation, and verification? The CSP provides explicit notice to the applicant at the time of collection regarding the purpose for collecting and 				IA-12, (3) c.2	
	 maintaining a record of the attributes necessary for identity proofing, including whether such attributes are voluntary or mandatory to complete the identity proofing process, and the consequences for not providing the attributes? If CSPs process attributes for purposes other than identity proofing, authentication, or attribute assertions (collectively "identity service"), related 				IA-12, (3)d	
	 fraud mitigation, or to comply with law or legal process, then CSPs implement measures to maintain predictability and manageability commensurate with the privacy risk arising from the additional processing? If the CSP employs consent as part of its measures to maintain predictability and 				IA-12, (3)e	
	 manageability,then it will NOT make consent for the additional processing a condition of the identity service? The CSP provides mechanisms for redress of applicant complaints or 				IA-12, (3)f	
	 redress of applicant complaints of problems arising from the identity proofing? The CSP assesses the [redress] mechanisms for their efficacy in 				IA-12, (3)g	
	achieving resolution of complaints or problems?				IA-12, (3)h	

#	QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 The identity proofing and enrollment processes is performed according to an applicable written policy or *practice statement* that specifies the particular steps taken to verify identities? The *practice statement* includes control 				IA-12, (3)i	
	 Information detailing how the CSP handles proofing errors that result in an applicant not being successfully enrolled? The CSP maintains a record, including 				IA-12, (3)j	
	 audit logs, of all steps taken to verify the identity of the applicant as long as the identity exists in the information system? The CSP records the types of identity 				IA-12, (3)k	
	evidence presented in the proofing				IA-12, (3)l	
	 The CSP conducts a risk management process, including assessments of privacy and security risks to determine: Any steps that it will take to verify the identity of the applicant beyond any mandatory requirements specified herein? The PII, including any biometrics, images, scans, or other copies of the identity evidence that the CSP will maintain as a record of identity proofing (Note: Specific 				IA-12, (3) m.1	
	federal requirements may apply)?				IA-12, (3) m.2	
	records ⁶ ?				IA-12, (3) m.3	
	 All PII collected as part of the enrollment process is protected to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and attribution of the information source? The entire proofing transaction, including transactions that involve a third party, occurs over authenticated protected channels? If the CSP uses froud mitigation 				IA-12, (3)n IA-12, (3)o	
	• If the CSP uses fraud mitigation measures, then the CSP conducts a					

⁶ CSPs may be subject to specific retention policies in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, or policies, including any National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records retention schedules that may apply.

Sample Audit Checklist for CJIS Security Policy (CJISSECPOL) Area 6

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	privacy risk assessment ⁷ for these				IA-12, (3)p	
	mitigation measures?					
	• In the event a CSP ceases to conduct identity proofing and annullment					
	processes then the CSP is responsible for					
	fully disposing of or destroying any					
	sensitive data including PII, or its					
	protection from unauthorized access for				IA-12, (3)q	
	the duration of retention?					
	• An enrollment code is comprised of one					
	of the following:					
	alphanumeric or equivalent					
	entropy. For example, a code					
	generated using an approved					
	random number generator or a				IA 12 (2) ~ 1	
	serial number for a physical				1A-12, (3) S.1	
	hardware authenticator?					
	o A machine-readable optical label, such as a Quick Response (QR)					
	Code, that contains data of similar					
	or higher entropy as a random six				IA (2) = 2	
	character alphanumeric?				1A-12, (5) 8.2	
	• Training requirements for personnel					
	validating evidence is based on the					
	policies, guidelines, or requirements of				IA-12, (3)t	
	• As applicable, this criterion applies to					
	CSPs that provide identity proofing and					
	enrollment services to minors (under the					
	age of 18):					
	• If the CSP provides identity					
	proofing and enrollment services					
	to minors (under the age of 18),					
	consideration to the legal					
	restrictions of interacting with					
	minors unable to meet the					
	evidence requirements of identity					
	proofing [to ensure compliance					
	with the Children's Online					
	(COPPA) and other laws as				IA-12, (3)u	
	applicable]?					

 $^{^{7}}$ Such assessments included any privacy risk mitigations (e.g., risk acceptance or transfer, limited retention, use limitations, notice) or other technological mitigations (e.g., cryptography), and be documented per requirement IA-12(3) k – m.

#	QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	• The CSP has the operator view the biometric source (e.g., fingers, face) for presence of non-natural materials and					
	 perform such inspections as part of the proofing process⁸? The CSP collects biometrics in such a 				IA-12, (3)v	
	way that ensures that the biometric is collected from the applicant, and not another subject ⁹ ? All biometric				IA-12, (3)w	
	performance requirements in IA-5 m (1) through (12) apply ¹⁰ .					
	 The CSP supports in-person or remote identity proofing, or both? The CSP collects at least one of the 				IA-12, (3)x	
	• The CSP conects at least one of the following identity evidence from the applicant:					
	 One piece of SUPERIOR or STRONG evidence if the evidence's issuing source, during its identity proofing event, confirmed the claimed identity by collecting two or more forms of SUPERIOR or STRONG 					
	evidence and the CSP validates the evidence directly with the issuing source ¹¹ ?				IA-12, (3) y.1	
	 Two pieces of STRONG evidence? One piece of STRONG evidence plus two pieces of FAIR 				IA-12, (3) y.2	
	 The CSP validates each piece of evidence with a process that can achieve the same strength as the evidence presented (see requirements referenced above for IA-12, (3) y). For example, if two forms of STRONG identity evidence are presented, 				IA-12, (3) y.3	
	each piece of evidence will be validated at a strength of STRONG?				IA-12, (3)z	

⁸ Requirements 'v' and 'w' apply to the collection of biometric characteristics for in-person (physical or supervised remote) identity proofing and are mandatory at Identity Assurance Level (IAL)3. These criteria also apply to CSPs that optionally choose to collect biometric characteristics through in-person identity proofing and enrollment at IAL2.

⁹ Id.

¹⁰ See <u>CJISD-ITS-DOC-08140-5.9.3</u>, pages 65-67.

¹¹ See <u>CJISD-ITS-DOC-08140-5.9.3</u>, Figure 8 – Notional Strengths of Evidence Types, pages 113-115.

#	QUESTION	YES	<i>N0</i>	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 The CSP verifies identity evidence as follows: At a minimum, the applicant's binding to identity evidence must be verified by a process that is able to achieve a strength of STRONG¹²? For Identity Assurance Level (IAL) 2 				IA-12, (3) aa	
	remote proofing: The collection of biometric characteristics for physical or biometric comparison of the applicant to the strongest piece of identity evidence provided to support the claimed identity performed remotely adheres to all requirements as specified in IA-5 m?				IA-12, (3) bb	
	 Knowledge-based verification (KBV) is NOT be used for in-person (physical or supervised remote) identity verification? The CSP employs appropriately tailored security controls, to include control 				IA-12, (3) cc	
	baseline of security controls defined in the CJISSECPOL?				IA-12, (3) dd	
	 The CSP ensures that the minimum assurance-related controls for moderate-impact systems are satisfied? Supervised Remote Identity Proofing: Supervised remote identity proofing is intended to provide controls for comparable levels of confidence and security to in-person IAL3 identity proofing for identity proofing processes that are performed remotely. Supervised remote identity proofing is optional for CSPs; that is, if a CSP chooses to use supervised remote identity proofing, then the following requirements, (1) through (8), would apply. It should be noted that the term "supervised remote identity proofing and is used only to refer to the specialized equipment and the following control requirements, (1) through (8). In addition to those requirements presented in this document, as well as the applicable. 				IA-12, (3) dd	

¹² See <u>CJISD-ITS-DOC-08140-5.9.3</u>, Figure 11 – Verification Methods and Strengths, page 119.

QUESTION

YES NO N/A STANDARD COMMENT

identity validation and verification requirements, CSPs that provide supervised remote identity proofing services must demonstrate conformance with the requirements contained in this section. The following requirements for supervised remote proofing apply specifically to IAL3. If the equipment/facilities used for supervised remote proofing are used for IAL2 identity proofing, the following requirements, (1) through (8), for supervised remote proofing do not apply. In this case, the requirements for conventional remote identity proofing are applicable. 0 Supervised remote identity proofing and enrollment transactions meet the following requirements, in addition to the IAL3 validation and verification requirements specified in IA-IA-12, (3) ee.1 12(3)s? The CSP monitors the entire 0 identity proofing session, from which the applicant does NOT depart — for example, by a continuous high-resolution video IA-12, (3) ee.2 transmission of the applicant? The CSP has a live operator 0 participate remotely with the applicant for the entirety of the IA-12, (3) ee.3 identity proofing session? The CSP requires all actions taken 0 by the applicant during the identity proofing session to be clearly visible to the remote operator? IA-12, (3) ee.4 The CSP requires that all digital 0 validation of evidence (e.g., via chip or wireless technologies) is performed by integrated scanners IA-12, (3) ee.5 and sensors? The CSP requires operators to 0 have undergone a training program to detect potential fraud and to properly perform a

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 supervised remote proofing session? The CSP employs physical tamper detection and resistance features appropriate for the environment in which it is located? The CSP ensures that all 				IA-12, (3) ee.6 IA-12, (3) ee.7	
	 The CSF ensures that an communications occur over a mutually authenticated protected channel? Trusted Referee: The use of trusted referees is optional for CSPs; that is, if a CSP chooses to use trusted referees for identity proofing and enrollment, then the following requirements, (1) through (3), would apply. The use of trusted referees is intended to assist in the identity proofing and enrollment for populations that are unable to meet IAL2 identity proofing requirements, or otherwise would be challenged to perform identity proofing and enrollment process requirements. Such populations may include, but are not limited to disabled individuals; elderly individuals; homeless individuals; individuals with little or no access to online services or computing devices; unbanked and individuals with little or no credit history; victims of 				IA-12, (3) ee.8	
	in addition to those requirements presented in the General section of this requirement, as well as the applicable IAL requirements, CSPs that use trusted referees in their identity proofing services must demonstrate conformance with the requirements contained here:					
	 If the CSP uses trusted referees, thenThe CSP has established a written policy and procedures as to how a trusted referee is determined and the lifecycle by which the trusted referee retains their status as a valid referee, to include any restrictions, as well as 					

#	QUESTION		YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	0	any revocation and suspension requirements? If the CSP uses trusted referees, thenThe CSP proofs the trusted referee at the same IAL as the applicant proofing? If the CSP uses trusted referees, thenThe CSP determines the minimum evidence required to bind the relationship between the trusted referee and the applicant?				IA-12, (3) ff.1 IA-12, (3) ff.2 IA-12, (3) ff.3	
31.	Based on inqu the Tribe or T	uiry and record examination, does					
	 Requision of prosocial of prosocial of prosocial of prosocial of prosocial of prosocial of the sum of	re that a registration code or notice ofing be delivered through an out- nd channel to verify the users ss (physical or digital) of record? y the CSP confirms the address of d? g source(s) or authoritative e(s) are valid records to confirm an ss? Self-asserted address data that of been confirmed in records are be used for confirmation. that IAL2-7 applies only to in- n proofing at IAL2. If the CSP rms in-person proofing for IAL2 and les an enrollment code directly to bscriber for binding to an nticator at a later time, then the ment codeis valid for a maximum en (7) days? mote identity proofing at IAL2, the CSP sends an enrollment code onfirmed address of record for the eant? mote identity proofing at IAL2, the applicant presents a valid ment code to complete the identity ing process? that the following enrollment code ty periods apply to enrollment codes o confirmed addresses of record for remote in-person proofing only. Iment codes shall have the following num validities:				IA-12, (5)a IA-12, (5)b IA-12, (5)c IA-12, (5)d IA-12, (5)e IA-12, (5)f	

#	QUESTION	YES	NO	N/A	STANDARD	COMMENT
	 10 days, when sent to a postal address of record within the contiguous United States? 20 does and on sent to a postal 				IA-12, (5) g.1	
	 30 days, when sent to a postal address of record outside the contiguous United States? 10 minutes, when sent to a 				IA-12, (5) g.2	
	telephone of record (SMS or voice)?				IA-12, (5) g.3	
	 24 hours, when sent to an email address of record? If the enrollment code sent to the 				IA-12, (5) g.4	
	 confirmed address of record as part of the remote identity proofing process at IAL2 is also intended to be an authentication factor, thenit is reset upon first use? If the CSP performs remote proofing at IAL2 and optionally sends notification of proofing in addition to sending the required enrollment code, thenThe CS ensures the enrollment code and 	e 2 f 3P			IA-12, (5)h	
	notification of proofing are sent to different addresses of record?				IA-12, (5)i	